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1 Introduction
This year we commemorate the centenary of the out-
break of the Great War, the First World War. The
remembrance events, museum exhibitions, TV pro-
grams and numerous publications rightly draw attention
to the Great War. Obviously, in the past century much
scholarly work has been dedicated to the Great War, its
causes and consequences and its lasting impact on indi-
viduals, societies, economies and cultures. However,
considerably less material is available on what effects – if
any – the Great War had on the development of law,
legal thinking and jurisprudence. This issue of Erasmus
Law Review is dedicated to that particular significance
of the Great War, be it confirmed, alleged or disputed
significance. It was the great Rudolph von Jhering who
posited: ‘[...] war can exert a wholesome influence on
legal development is less a paradox than it appears. A
well-timed war can do more to encourage development
in few years than centuries of peaceful existence’.1 Did
the Great War indeed have this ‘wholesome influence’
on legal developments or was the War a mere ripple or
perhaps a prelude to bigger and worse things to come?
Arguably, the War had been a long time coming. The
conditions set by nineteenth-century imperialist expan-
sionism and the concomitant arms race, together with
the sparks in the powder keg caused by the least demo-
cratic nations in Europe (the German, Austrian-
Hungarian and Russian monarchies) started the inferno
of an unparalleled War that was to rage over Europe for
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1. „Daß der Krieg auf die Entwicklung des Rechts und Staats den heil-
samsten Einfluß ausüben kann, ist weniger paradox, als es klingt. Ein
Krieg zur rechten Zeit kann diese Entwicklung in wenig Jahren mehr för-
dern, als Jahrhunderte friedlicher Existenz”. See R. von Jhering, Geist
des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwick-
lung. Erster Theil (Verlag von Breitkopf und Härtel, Leipzig 1852), at
239.
four long bloody years.2 The War was of an unparalleled
scale. It was global in the sense that it spread to colonies
and dominions in Asia and Africa. It was total in the
sense that combat was waged on land, by sea and in the
air.3 By the time the Armistice was agreed on
11 November 1918, some eight million people had lost
their lives.4 Although the emphasis in the Western
European narrative usually lies on the sickening waste of
human life on Belgian and French soil, not many know
that it was actually the Serbians who suffered the most
casualties relative to the size of their population.5
The day before the Armistice, in the early morning
hours of November 10, the erratic and out-of-touch
Kaiser Wilhelm II and his entourage had stopped their
nine motor vehicles en route from Spa in the insignifi-
cant Dutch border village Eijsden to ask permission to
obtain asylum in the Netherlands.6 The Dutch govern-
ment grasped the opportunity to operationalise their
coveted doctrine of neutrality and granted Wilhelm asy-
lum. Attempts by French prime minister, Clemenceau,
and British prime-minister, Lloyd George, to bully the
Dutch into handing over their political refugee led to
nothing; the Dutch were not prepared to give in.7 Wil-
helm got to spend the rest of his life in exile in a tiny
Dutch castle, which was stuffed with the contents of the
many railway carriages that followed him to the Nether-
lands.8 Ironically, when Wilhelm died in 1941 the world
was at war again, only this time the Netherlands was
firmly occupied by the Germans.
2. On the background variables imperialism, expansionism and arms race
that set the scene for the Great War, see, e.g. G. Hardach, The First
World War 1914-1918 (Allan Lane, London 1977); P. Kennedy, The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers – Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (Random House, New York 1987), at 194
ff.; J. Sperber, Europe 1850-1914 (Pearson Longman, London 2009), at
302; R. Findlay and K.H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty – Trade, War,
and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton U.P.,
Princeton 2007), at 387 ff.
3. Cf. G. Hirschfeld and G. Krumeich, Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg
(S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 2013), at 95 f.
4. Precise numbers of casualties which can be directly attributed to the
Great War are unavailable and are skewed by related causes of death
such as food shortages, disease and deprivation (combined with flue
epidemics). Numbers seem to vary from 7 to 15 million. Cf. E. Dams-
gaard Hansen, European Economic History – From Mercantilism to
Maastricht and Beyond (CBS Press, Copenhagen 2012), at 202 ff.
5. Hirschfeld and Krumeich, above n. 3, at 94.
6. C. Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog – Derde deel 1917-1919
(Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen 1973), at 8 ff.
7. M. Carter, George, Nicholas and Wilhelm – Three Royal Cousins and
the Road to World War I (Knopf, New York 2010), at 416.
8. The castle, ornately decorated with imperial paraphernalia, is open to
the public. See <www.huisdoorn.nl>.
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The Great War left Europe destroyed and uprooted by
combat, migration and border corrections. Moreover, it
left the belligerent countries – both victors and van-
quished – cash-strapped and in debt for decades.9 The
440 articles of the 1919 Versailles Treaty in all their
detail compelled the Central Powers to accept sole
responsibility for starting the Great War,10 to endure
border corrections, to disarm and to make debilitating
large payments to the victors.11 Thus, the peace terms
brought about a state of economic and political instabili-
ty12 in Europe which, in hindsight, may well be consid-
ered to be the root cause of the Second World War.13
Arguably, one enduring political lesson that the Great
War may hold is that conquest without a realistic per-
spective of rehabilitation of the vanquished not only
hampers reconciliation of the peoples concerned but
may also impede economic growth of all economies con-
cerned. As early as the 1920s, Konrad Adenauer, who
was later to become the founding father of the West
German Republic, argued that an organic intertwining
the French, Belgian and German economies would
ensure lasting and sustainable peace in Europe. The
future lay in a United States of Europe.14
The Great War was different from previous wars
– through its scale and intensity it reached and affected
just about every corner of European society. The out-
break of the War caused the Western international trade
and payment systems to come to a grinding halt. In the
first weeks currencies faltered, coinage was hoarded,
stocks plummeted and stock trade was quickly suspend-
ed. The legislative response to all this was swift but
makeshift. Piecemeal moratoria were hastily introduced
to create breathing space for debtors who, due to the
collapse of international and national trade and banking,
found themselves in unexpected liquidity problems and
9. D.H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street 1919-1929 (Allen Lane,
London 1977); H. Strachan, Financing the First World War (Oxford
U.P., Oxford 2004) ; H-C. Kraus, Versailles und die Folgen – Außenpo-
litik zwischen Revisionismus und Verständigung 1919-1933 (be.bra
Verlag, Berlin 2013).
10. Art. 231 Versailles Treaty provided: ‘The Allied and Associated Govern-
ments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and
her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and
Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a
consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Ger-
many and her allies.’
11. Cf. Kraus, above n. 9, at 27 ff.
12. On these destabilising economic consequences, e.g., S. Broadberry and
K.H.O’Rourke (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Europe – Volume 2: 1870 to the Present (Cambridge U.P., Cambridge
2010), at 134.
13. The causal chain between the harsh treaty terms and subsequent events
such as the 1920s hyperinflation and the rise of the German National
Socialist Party is contested among historians. See, e.g. Kraus, above n.
9, at 149 f.; K. Wiegrefe, ‘Der Unfriede von Versailles’, in S. Burgdorff
and K. Wiegrefe (eds.), Der Erste Weltkrieg – Die Ur-Katastrophe des
20. Jahrhunderts (Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 2008), at
235 ff; Hirschfeld and Krumeich, above n. 3, at 265 ff.; Hardach, above
n. 2, at 294; N. Ferguson, The Pity of War 1914-1918 (Penguin, Lon-
don 1999), at 397 ff.
14. H.P. Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg: 1876-1952, 3rd edn. (Stuttgart,
DVA 1991), at 513-15.
were unable to pay their debts as a result.15 To counter
the unbalancing effects of coinage hoarding and bank
runs, either formal restrictions on cash withdrawals or
informal dissuasion policies were applied.16 Later, the
belligerent nations experienced inflation and dramatic
exchange rate fluctuations, necessitating some countries
to suspend the gold standard.
Apart from these emergency responses, the Great War
also marked the beginning of the end of the long nine-
teenth century for European economies and societies.
The Victorian laissez-faire approach to society and mar-
kets, in which freedom of trade and contract was
deemed normatively superior to protection of labourers,
tenants, the poor and weaker parties generally, was
already eroding fast in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century. Universal suffrage was in the
air, the labour rights movement was firmly established
and the plight of the lower classes had more political
relevance than a hundred years earlier. The Great War
did not cause these developments, but it did much to
accelerate them.
The experience of a drawn-out war of this scale and
intensity was new. It necessitated rethinking of the eco-
nomic framework of state and society both in terms of
the regulatory architecture of markets – ranging from
foodstuffs to financial products, from fuel to transport
services – and the budgetary choices and leeway of
nation states. The Great War prompted the introduc-
tion of emergency interventionist legislation for most
parts of socio-economic life. Thus, it introduced restric-
tions on freedom of contract in the areas of labour, rent
and housing, food production and transport. Typical
war provisions such as trading restrictions were intro-
duced and increasingly tightened. Moreover, market
interventions ranging from price capping to property
requisitioning, forced purchase and compulsory (re)dis-
tribution of scarce resources were introduced on an
unparalleled scale. All this marked a permanent change
of the role of the state; when the guns were finally
silenced, the state had become the regulator of economic
life and the distributor of wealth. Its role would never
change back to that which it had assumed during the
long nineteenth century.
The Great War had a huge impact on state finances.
Not merely the cost of combat itself but also the endur-
ing expense of war pensions caused a lasting rise in gov-
ernment expenditure of the combatant nations. More-
over, the Great War necessitated governments to rede-
sign their legislative frameworks for securing income
streams. Initially, financing the war effort was a far big-
ger problem for those countries such as France, which
did not have direct taxation instruments easily adjusta-
ble to generate revenues to alleviate sovereign debt, and
Germany, which did have an imperial army but lacked
15. Cf. R. Roberts, Saving the City – The Great Financial Crisis of 1914
(Oxford U.P., Oxford 2013); M. Lobban, ‘Introduction: The Great War
and Private Law’, 2 Comparative Legal History (2014) forthcoming).
16. Some countries introduced ‘substitute coinage’ in paper tender. See
P. Moeyes, Buiten Schot – Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog
(Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam 2001), at 164 ff.
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the power of direct federal (income) taxation.17 There-
fore, in comparison to the UK, France and Germany
had to rely more on other instruments of financing such
as government bonds and money creation than on taxa-
tion.18 Traders who profiteered from war conditions
were levied a war profits tax.
Naturally, the Great War also signalled a next stage in
the development of international law and its theoretical
underpinnings. As a direct outcome of the War, the
Versailles Treaty created the League of Nations for the
promotion of global peace and stability.
2 The Contributions
From the previous, it is clear that the Great War and all
it entailed had a lasting impact on societies, markets, the
political landscape in European countries and on the
trajectory of international law. As a consequence, the
legal doctrines and conditions somehow changed as
well. In the contributions to this issue of Erasmus Law
Review, four different viewpoints of this change are pre-
sented: colonial constitutional law and governance, con-
tract law, international relations and public international
law, and finally international criminal law. Obviously,
these four themes do not cover the entirety of the
breadth of subjects that could be addressed in this
regard. They do, however, exemplify the influence of
the Great War on law, legal thinking and jurisprudence.
The first theme concerns colonial constitutional law and
governance. In his contribution titled ‘The First World
War and the Constitutional Law for the Netherlands
Indies’, Nick Efthymiou asks what the contribution of
the Great War was to two major events in the Nether-
lands Indies constitutional governance structure. Obvi-
ously, the War made communication, travel and trade
between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies
difficult. But did it also cause a shift in constitutional
law and governance? It may well have. In 1918, a repre-
sentative body ‘People’s Council’ was introduced and
accelerated constitutional reform was promised to the
colony. The question is whether the Great War caused
or accelerated these developments. In his contribution,
17. A. Gaaff, Financiering van de Eerste Wereldoorlog – Vier jaar vechten
op krediet (Uitgeverij Aspekt, Soesterberg 2014), at 69 ff. In the Neth-
erlands, following a lengthy process of parliamentary proceedings start-
ing in 1906, a new system of income taxation was introduced in 1914
(Wet van 19 December 1914, Staatsblad 1914, no. 563). See
J.H.R. Sinninghe Damsté, De Wet op de Inkomstenbelasting en de Wet
op de Verdedigingsbelasting II (2nd edn. W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle
1923), at 31 ff.; J. Visser and M. Visser, ‘Profijt en protest – Verscherp-
ing der sociale tegenstellingen in Nederland gedurende de Eerste
Wereldoorlog’, in H. Binneveld (ed.), Leven naast de catastrofe –
Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog (Verloren, Hilversum 2001),
at 93 ff. The new Income Tax Act (ITA) 1914 charged tax on income
from immovable and movable property, business and employment and
annuities and pensions. See H. Vording and O. Ydema, ‘The Rise and
Fall of Progressive Income Taxation in the Netherlands (1795-2001)’,
British Tax Review 255, at 271 (2007).
18. Gaaff, above n. 17, at 69 ff. This was especially the case in the first half
of the War – legislative intervention in France and Germany soon
addressed these deficiencies.
Efthymiou dissects the various mechanisms and con-
cludes that one of the two developments, the promise of
reform, can indeed be traced back to the Great War.
The second theme concerns contract law; it explores
how courts in Europe grappled with the question how
contract law doctrines should respond to the economic
chaos and upheaval caused by the Great War. Janwil-
lem Oosterhuis investigates ‘Unexpected Circumstan-
ces Arising from World War I and Its Aftermath:
“Open” versus “Closed” Legal Systems’. His compara-
tive analysis of French, German, English and Dutch
contract law shows that courts were consistently reticent
to allow the War to serve as an excuse for non-perform-
ance of contractual obligations. Thus, the judicial
approach to unforeseen circumstances was more ‘closed’
than ‘open’. The devastating effects of the hyperinfla-
tion of the German currency in the 1920s, however,
opened the door to a more debtor-friendly approach.
The author thus concludes that it was not the Great
War itself but the economic turmoil afterwards that
caused this paradigmatic shift.
The third theme centres around the development of
public international law thinking in the United States
before and after the Great War. Ignacio de la Rasilla
del Moral analyses ‘The Ambivalent Shadow of the
Pre-Wilsonian Rise of International Law’. By focussing
on the pedigree of the American international lawyers
who founded the American Society of International Law
at the beginning of the twentieth century, the author is
able to present a fuller picture of the ethical and legal
stance of these founders. Further, by showing the full
chronology from as early as the 1898 Spanish American
War to well beyond the Great War, the author identifies
some of the factors that were conducive in the develop-
ment of the American approach to international. In
doing so, the analysis sheds light on such issues as the
position of the United States vis-à-vis the League of
Nations and the development of international law theory
after the Great War.
The fourth theme is concerned with what we would
now call international criminal law. Co-authors Paul
Mevis and Jan Reijntjes deal with the intriguing
‘what if’ question raised by Article 227 of the Versailles
Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers held Wil-
helm II of Hohenzollern to account for waging war. The
Treaty was the legal basis for the institution of a Tribu-
nal where he would betried for violating treaties and
offences against international morality. The trial never
happened, but what if it had happened? Would the
Emperor have been convicted, and would it be justice?
Would it have paved the way for the Nuremberg trials?
In conclusion, we feel the pictures painted in these four
contributions add to the literature on the ramifications
of the Great War for law, legal thinking and jurispru-
dence. We thank the contributors and the reviewers for
their willingness to compile a fitting commemoration of
one of the greatest atrocities suffered by mankind. We
hope the reader considers this issue of Erasmus Law
Review a fitting tribute.
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